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Abstract Fault identification and location in optical networks must cope with a
multitude of factors: (i) the redundancy and the lack of coordination
(internetworking) of the managements at the different layers (WDM,
SDH/SONET, ATM, IP); (ii) the large number of alarms a single failure
can trigger; (iii) the difficulty in detecting some failures and the resulting
need to cope with missing or false alarms.
This chapter first details the behavior of network components in
transparent WDM networks when a failure occurs. Using this model, we
then describe an efficient algorithm (Fault Location Algorithm, FLA)
pointing out the element(s) which is (are) most likely to be the cause
of the received alarms. Although the problem of multiple failure diag-
nosis is known to be NP-hard, the non-polynomial complexity of the
algorithm is pushed ahead in a pre-computational phase, which can be
done off-line, and not at the time of a failure. The diagnosis phase is
therefore very rapid. We discuss the time and space complexity of the
FLA.
Keywords: WDM network components, failure model, failure management, com-
plexity.
1. Introduction
Because of the huge data rates that a single optical fiber can carry us-
ing WDM technology, a ribbon break yields the interruption of hundreds
of thousands of flows, and the loss of thousands of megabits of data [1].
Survivability of optical networks, which includes fault identification and
location, has thus become a crucial problem.
When a failure occurs at the physical layer, the lightpaths that are
affected have to be restored as soon as possible so that higher layers do
2not see the failure and do not start their own restoration mechanisms.
In the meantime, the failure has to be located and repaired.
Failures are located from the alarms received by the management
system. When there are two or more simultaneous failures, the number
of alarms considerably increases, the alarms arrive intermingled at the
management system and the problem of locating the failures becomes
even more difficult. The problem of locating multiple failures has been
shown to be NP-hard by Rao [2].
The location of the failure(s) must be fast and accurate, so that a small
set of faulty candidates can be rapidly identified, before expensive repair
actions are undertaken. Failures are less rare than one might expect; [3]
has recently reported a failure rate of 1 per year per 300km of fiber.
Submarine cables, which are vulnerable to damage from submarines,
anchors and fishing gears, have to be repaired once every five weeks [4].
Network management is essential to ensure the good functioning of
these networks. Every network management performs several functions,
which have been classified into five different functional areas by OSI,
and are briefly recalled here.
Configuration Management deals with the initialization of the
network components, the establishment, maintenance and updat-
ing of relationships among them. These relationships are based on
the connections established and cleared down in the network. Con-
figuration management must also reconfigure the network when-
ever necessary and include routines that are able to inform about
any change in the configuration (for example, when a protection
switch changes its position, the manager should be informed about
the new paths of the established channels).
Performance Management monitors and controls the compo-
nents in the network. Monitoring is the function that tracks activ-
ities in the network, whereas the control function enables adjust-
ments in the components to improve network performance. The
main performance issues are: network capacity utilization, exis-
tence of excessive traffic and of bottlenecks, and increase of re-
sponse time. Performance management collects information from
the network and analyzes it so that the management system can
recognize situations of performance degradation.
Security Management deals with the generation, distribution
and storage of encryption keys. It also monitors and controls access
to computer networks and to management information.
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Accounting Management. Many network services are charged
to the users. Network management performs not only the internal
accounting but also other tasks, such as checking allowed access
privileges.
Fault Management deals with [5]:
– fault detection, to know whether there is a failure or not in
the network,
– fault location, to know which is/are the component(s) that
has/have failed and caused the received alarms,
– fault isolation (so-called protection) in order for the network
to continue to operate, which is the fast and automated way
to restore interrupted connections. In general, it is imple-
mented with protection switches that change positions when
the optical powers drop below a certain threshold.
– network (re-)configuration (so-called restoration) that mini-
mizes the impact of a fault by restoring the interrupted con-
nections using spare equipments. This involves some process-
ing to discover the best paths to re-route the connections.
– replacement of the failed component(s).
Protection and restoration mechanisms in optical networks is an
active field of research. This chapter focuses on the fault location
problem. This problem is not specific to optical networks, but is
encountered in many fields, such as electrical power plants mon-
itoring, medical diagnosis, electric circuit analysis, nuclear power
station maintenance and management of communication networks
at large. Here we consider only its application to optical networks,
although many methods are actually valid or have been developed
in more general settings. Fault location is particularly important
for optical networks, where the quantity of information carried is
much larger than over other physical media, making the effects of
a failure much more severe.
2. Fault Location Problem definition
Optical communication networks, and all networks in general, need a
fault management system that performs fault diagnosis, that is, able to
identify the faults that occur from the information given by the network
components. A fault can be defined as an unpermitted deviation of
at least one characteristic parameter or variable of a network element
4from acceptable/usual/standard values, whereas a failure can be defined
as the manifestation of the fault. For example, if the ventilator in a
laser stops, and if the temperature increases and overpasses an accepted
temperature limit, the fault is the stopped ventilator and the failure is
the temperature of the laser, which is too high. Because both terms are
closely related, we use them indistinctly.
Fault detection relies on the monitoring of the state of the network
components. Simple fault detection mechanisms are often based on lo-
cally monitored variables. The faulty values reached by these variables
are logged as errors. Critical errors are sent to the network manager
as alarms. However, it is not always possible to detect complex faults
on the sole basis of locally monitored variables: it is then necessary to
have a global knowledge of the network and to do some processing to
diagnose the presence (or absence), the nature and the location of the
fault. Also, and because the fault can propagate to components that
depend on the failed component, the influences of faulty components on
other components have to be taken in account to perform an efficient
fault management.
Communication networks are built on several layers, each performing
fault management functions independently. When a failure occurs, sev-
eral symptoms or event indications are issued to the network manager
from different management layers, and fault management functions start
in parallel. Research is carried out to allow interoperability between dif-
ferent layers, to avoid task duplication and increase efficiency.
The fault location problem is solved by Fault Management Systems
that take the events generated by the network elements as input (these
events can be alarms, warnings or parameters of the network elements),
and produce an output, which is the set of network elements whose
failures explain the input events.
These fault management systems differ in:
1 the way they solve the problem: using neural networks [6, 7], Fi-
nite State Machines [8–10], the history of previous cases [11], a
(detailed) modeling of the network [12]. A classification of these
methods into model-based methods and Black box learning-based
approaches is made in [13]. The first one relies on an abstract
model of the network, capturing the dependency relations between
the elements and capable of pointing out the element(s) which is
(are) most likely to be the cause of the received alarms. The second
one does not attempt to model the network in detail, but leaves
it as a black box. An abnormal situation is then diagnosed from
a set of rules obtained by learning or thanks to expertise of the
human manager.
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2 the information they need: failure propagation probabilities [14],
timestamps, set of established channels [12], etc.
3 the assumptions on which they rely: existence of only single fail-
ures [15], existence of multiple failures [12, 16, 17], etc.
4 the quantity of memory they use: large memory requirements [11,
12] to store failure history, modest memory requirements or even
absence of memory requirements [15, 14, 9, 8, 10], etc.
5 intolerance [11, 18] or tolerance [6, 12] to false and missing alarms.
3. A failure model of optical networks
We distinguish two classes of network components: (i) Optical com-
ponents , which take care of the optical signal transmission and are not
able to send alarms, except, in some cases, for their own failures (but
never when the received optical signals are not as expected); and (ii)
Monitoring equipments that are able to send alarms and notifications
when the monitored optical signals are not the expected one. The alarms
sent by monitoring equipments depend on the equipment type and char-
acteristics. Failure of a monitoring equipment does not interrupt/modify
the data transmission, it may only result in the loss of an alarm. It is
not as relevant as the failure of an optical component, and therefore is
not considered in the present study.
Optical equipment
The optical equipment in a transparent optical network can be listed
as follows.
Transmitters (Txs), which are located at the beginning of an opti-
cal channel, are lasers or laser arrays converting electrical signals
into optical ones at a certain wavelength. New lasers used in ad-
vanced WDM networks are tunable and can change the emission
wavelength within a prescribed range. Some lasers do include a
wavelength locker so that when the emitted wavelength deviates
from the expected value due, for example, to temperature changes,
it resets the transmitter to the original wavelength.
Receivers (Rxs), which are located at the end of an optical channel,
convert the received optical signal of a certain wavelength, into an
electrical one.
Optical switches: There are different switches architectures, each
of them having different crosstalk characteristics: crossbar, Clos,
6Spanke, Benes, and Spanke-Benes. Different technologies can be
used for their implementation (except MEMS, all these technolo-
gies are used in crossbar architectures: Micro-Electro-Mechanical
System (MEMS), Bulk mechanical, Bubble-based waveguide, Liq-
uid crystal, Thermo-optical, SOA).
Amplifiers, which output a signal at a higher power level than
the input signal, usually add distortion to the signal. A fault
may occur when the pump laser (in the case of EDFA and Raman
amplifiers) fails or when the fiber or a passive component within
the amplifiers fails. Other faults may involve the failure of the gain
monitoring system causing gain variations. They send alarms for
example when the pump laser does not work properly, or when the
incoming power falls below a threshold value.
Optical regenerators and wavelength converters: These two types
of elements are included in the same category since they are based
upon similar physical principles and technologies. There are three
techniques to perform optical wavelength conversion and regener-
ation: optical gating, interferometric, and wave mixing based.
Couplers (Splitters/combiners): These elements are included in
some demultiplexers/multiplexer architectures. Their key perfor-
mance parameter is their insertion loss that should be kept low so
that when included in serial architectures the overall loss is still
acceptable.
Optical filters: These components have two important applica-
tions: to be used to multiplex and demultiplex wavelengths in a
WDM system, and to provide equalization of the gain and filtering
of noise in optical amplifiers. The most important characteristics
of optical filters are: insertion loss, temperature coefficient, flat
passband, and sharp passband skirts.
Protection switches, which receive multiple optical signals, and
select the one with an acceptable power level. Note that these
elements could also be considered as monitoring equipments, since
they send alarms when they change the switch positions due to
unacceptable incoming optical powers.
Monitoring equipment
Different types of monitoring equipment exist in the market and are
used in transparent optical networks [19, 20]. They monitor the optical
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signals using tapping couplers. We assume that for monitoring pur-
poses, the optical signal can be converted to the electrical domain. We
distinguish six different types of monitoring equipment:
Optical Power Meter: detects any change in the power of the opti-
cal signal over a wide band. It may be able to send an alarm when
the measured power is different from the expected one. When the
power decrease is very slow, it takes a longer time to be detected
and an alarm takes longer to be generated. In some cases, the
BER can be severely degraded without a corresponding decrease
in the optical power. For example, amplifiers with automatic gain
control deliver signals with the expected power even if they contain
too much noise.
Optical Spectrum Analyzer [21] performs analog optical signal
monitoring by measuring the spectrum of the optical signal. The
parameters that can be measured are channel power, channel cen-
ter wavelength and optical signal to noise ratio (OSNR), which is
useful and provides important information on the health and qual-
ity of the optical signal. For example, it is able to detect OSNR
changes (even if they do not cause optical power variations) and
the unexpected out-of-band signals. However, this equipment suf-
fers from slow responses and possible sampling errors.
Eye Monitoring derives from the eye diagram information on the
time distortion and interferences. The resulting histogram is used
to study the statistical characteristics of the optical signal [22, 23].
BER Monitoring: After converting the signal to the electrical do-
main, this equipment is able to calculate the Bit Error Rate which
is sensitive to noise and time distortion. BER Testers compare the
expected with the received bit pattern and the differences that are
found, give the estimated BER. This equipment is sensitive to im-
pairments such as crosstalk, chromatic and polarization mode dis-
persion, and optical non-linearities. Most of the BER techniques
are based on the synchronous [24, 25] or asynchronous [23, 26]
sampling of the optical signal.
Wavemeter is an accurate monitoring equipment able to detect any
variation in the used wavelength.
Pilot tones are signals that travel with the data but can be re-
trieved easily. For example, pilot tones may use different carrier
frequencies from the transmitted signals (in WDM systems), dif-
ferent time slots (in TDM systems), or different codes (in CDMA
8systems). Pilot tones can detect transmission disruptions, but not
in-band jamming problems unless they affect the pilot tone fre-
quency (which in this case may not affect the transmitted signals).
Optical Time Domain Reflectometry (OTDR) techniques are based
on pilot tones. However, the difference is that OTDR analyzes
the pilot tone’s echo. This method is used to detect fiber cut
and bending that causes data signal loss. OTDR may be able to
detect some faults that pilot tones cannot. For example, a jamming
signal may not be detected by a pilot tone if it does not cover its
frequency, but the pilot tone’s echo may contain remainders of the
jamming signal that have reflected.
Table 1.1 summarizes the monitoring properties of the components
listed above, for a transparent WDM network.
Table 1.1. Failure detection capabilities of monitoring equipment.
Monitoring Power In-band Out-band Wavelength Time
Component Jamming Jamming misalignment distortion
Opt. Power Meter yes no no no no
Opt. Sp. Anal. yes no yes no no
Eye Monitoring yes no yes no yes
BER Monitoring yes yes yes no yes
Wavemeter yes no no yes no
Pilot Tones yes no no no yes
OTDR yes sometimes sometimes no yes
AWDM network is formed by a number of optical channels, which are
composed of the different components listed above. The classification of
this section enables us to abstract the network components in two cat-
egories: optical (passive) components, and monitoring components. To
keep the exposition of the Fault Location Algorithm sufficiently simple
in the next section, we assume that only power is monitored, which is
the only variable that will be detected by all monitoring components. In
reality, the algorithm is much more complex, as each monitoring com-
ponent belongs to a different sub-category, as defined by the alarms
that can be generated according to Table 1.1 (see also [27, 28]). The
classification becomes even richer, when we include opaque networks.
Figure 1.1 shows an example of two channels in a transparent network,
abstracted using the models elaborated in this section.
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Figure 1.1. Example of a transparent ultra long haul WDM network including some
monitoring equipments at some relevant components such as an amplifier with a Dy-
namic Spectrum Equalizer (DSE) or an Optical Add-Drop Multiplexer with Wave-
length Selective architecture. The figure also shows two established channels that
have been modeled: the optical components are reprensented by circles, and the
monitoring equipments by rectangles.
4. Fault location algorithm (FLA)
Time to locate failure(s) is critical, any good fault location algorithm
must be able to locate fault as quick as possible. Unfortunately, the
fault localization problem has been shown to be NP-Hard by Rao in [2]
even in the ideal scenarios where there are no erroneous alarms. Never-
theless, the computation that has to be carried out when alarms reach
the manager can be kept short despite the potentially large size of the
network, if we follow the fault location algorithm (FLA) proposed in
[12] to pre-compute, as much as possible, the functions that can be
executed independently of the received alarms. This phase is called
the pre-computation phase (PCP ). The pre-computation phase is exe-
cuted only when relationships between fault sources and alarm elements
change, for example when a channel is set up or torn down, not when
the alarms are received. Once the manager starts receiving alarms from
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the network, the algorithm does not have to perform complex compu-
tation but simply traverses a binary tree. This minimizes the time the
algorithm needs to deliver results to the manager when failures occur.
FLA to localize single failure in the ideal case
We first start by solving the problem of localizing single failure. In
this case, only a single network component can fail at a time and when
a network component fails, the monitoring components that follow it on
a channel will issue alarms.
Let us illustrate the steps of the algorithm on the network in Fig-
ure 1.1. For the sake of simplicity in our description, we will only
consider a fraction of the network as in Figure 1.2, this is equivalent
to assume that all optical components preceding OF2 in both channel
1 and channel 2 never fail. There are two established channels in the
network (CH = {CH1, CH2}). We label the network elements by p for
optical (passive) components and e for the monitoring components. In
this example, there are 10 passive elements p1, ..., p10 and 4 monitoring
elements e1, ..., e4.
Channel 1
Channel 2
p1
p5
p4p2 p3
p6 p7 e3 p8 p9 p10 e4
e2e1
Figure 1.2. Reduced network example
The PCP consists in the following steps.
1 Compute the domain for each optical component. The domain of
an optical component is defined as the set of monitoring equip-
ments that will trigger alarms when that optical component fails.
In the example, we obtain
Domain(p1) = {e1, e2, e3, e4} , Domain(p2) = {e1, e2, e3, e4},
Domain(p3) = {e2, e3, e4} , Domain(p4) = {e2},
Domain(p5) = {e3, e4} , Domain(p6) = {e3, e4},
Domain(p7) = {e3, e4} , Domain(p8) = {e4},
Domain(p9) = {e4} , Domain(p10) = {e4}.
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2 Group all identical domains into fault classes
C1 = Domain(p1) = Domain(p2) = {e1, e2, e3, e4},
C2 = Domain(p3) = {e2, e3, e4},
C3 = Domain(p5) = Domain(p6) = Domain(p7) = {e3, e4},
C4 = Domain(p4) = {e2},
C5 = Domain(p8) = Domain(p9) = Domain(p10) = {e4}.
3 Compute the set P (Ci) of elements that belong to the same fault
class Ci, in other words, the optical components whose failures can-
not be distinguished by the network manager from the monitoring
information. In this example, these sets are:
P (C1) = {p1, p2} , P (C2) = {p3} , P (C3) = {p5, p6, p7} , P (C4) =
{p4} and P (C5) = {p8, p9, p10}.
4 Construct the dependency matrix where each column of the depen-
dency matrix is a binary vector Bin(Ci) with as many elements as
the number of monitoring components in the established channels
(4 in this example). The jth component of Bin(Ci) is equal to 1
if the jth monitoring equipment fires alarm when elements in the
fault class Ci fail, and 0 otherwise. In the example, let us denote
by G the dependency matrix, then
G =

1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1
 .
5 Build a binary tree for single failures: The binary tree has a depth
equal to the number of alarm elements and leaves correspond to
different binary combinations. Occupied leaves point to the fault
class Ci whose corresponding column in the dependency matrix,
Bin(Ci), is the path from the root of the tree to the leaves. The
binary tree constructed for this example is shown in Figure 1.3.
FLA to localize multiple failures in the ideal case
Let us now consider the case where several failures may happen in a
short interval of time so that the alarms reaching the manager are inter-
mingled. The algorithm has to be able to distinguish the failures based
on the received alarms. To solve this problem, the binary tree is extended
by adding leaves which correspond to multiple failures. This amounts
to computing the domains of simultaneous failures which are the union
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 e4
P(C1) = {p1, p2}
P(C4) = {p4}
P(C3) = {p5, p6, p7}
P(C5) = {p8, p9, p10}
1
P(C2) = {p3}
Figure 1.3. Binary tree for single failures
of the domains of single failures. We begin with double failures. The
construction are as follows. Let Ci = Domain(pi), Cj = Domain(pj)
and Ck be the domain for double failures of pi and pj , then
Bin(Ck) = Bin(Ci ∪ Cj) = Bin(Ci) ∨Bin(Cj),
where ∨ stands for the point-wise OR operation between Bin(Ci) and
Bin(Cj).
If Bin(Ck) is equal to Bin(Cl) for an existing failure class Cl, the leaf
is already occupied by the domain of a single failure. We can reasonably
assume that single failure is more likely to occur than multiple failures,
hence the occupied leaf points to the more likely single failure. Con-
versely, if Bin(Ck) is different from any of the existing leaves, a new leaf
is then occupied and pointed to the double failures. Once all the new
leaves corresponding to double failures are filled, we proceed likewise for
triple failures, etc. Note that if at some point of this procedure, there
is a Ck corresponding to a single failure which is such that for all the
already computed Ci’s,
Bin(Ci) ∨Bin(Ck) = Bin(Ci) or Bin(Ci) ∨Bin(Ck) = Bin(Ck),
then Ck will not contribute to any new leaf anymore. Therefore, it needs
not be considered for further steps with more failures. This property
allows us to decrease the number of binary vectors corresponding to
single failures needed for computing the domain of multiple ones. The
process finishes when the set of single failures becomes empty.
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Let us consider the example shown in Figure 1.2. The output of this
part of the algorithm is the following:
Bin(C4) ∨Bin(C5) = Bin(C6).
One new failure class Ci has been found. It is defined by the vector
Bin(C6) = (0, 1, 0, 1). The resulting binary tree is shown in Figure 1.4.
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0
0
1
0
1
0
e1 e3 e4
P(C1) = {p1, p2}
P(C4) = {p4}
P(C3) = {p5, p6, p7}
P(C5) = {p8, p9, p10}
1
e2
P(C2) = {p3}
P(C6) = {(p4,p8),(p4,p9),
(p4,p10)}
Figure 1.4. Binary tree for multiple failures
FLA to localize multiple failures in the non-ideal
case
Alarm errors are unavoidable in network diagnosis. There are two
kinds of erroneous alarms: missing alarms and false alarms . Missing
alarms occur when some alarms are lost, or arrive with such a delay
that they cannot be considered during the ongoing computation of the
algorithm or if a monitoring component is itself defective. False alarms
can occur when, due to abnormal situations, a monitoring component
sends an alarm although there is no real failure. The empty leaves in the
binary tree for multiple failures in Figure 1.4 are those corresponding to
missing or false alarms.
The tree can be viewed as a particular block error-correcting code,
whose codewords have the property that the logical OR of any two code-
words is another codeword. One empty leaf of the tree corresponds to
an erroneous word, and the error correction task would be to replace
the erroneous word by the correct codeword whose Hamming distance
with the received word is minimal. The problem of finding the near-
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est codeword to an arbitrary word can be shown to be NP-complete,
but however, there are special instances where this problem is easy to
solve. We will discuss these cases in the next section when we discuss
the computational complexity of the FLA. In the rest of this section, we
will show how the binary tree can be extended to deal with erroneous
alarms.
Contrary to the use of error-correcting codes for data transmission,
the manager of a network does not require unique decoding. Indeed,
he/she will prefer to get the set of all faulty candidates whose domains
are close to the received alarms. In fact, we can use the bounded distance
decoding approach by giving all the codewords that realize a given alarm
mismatching threshold as possible answers. For example, if we tolerate a
maximum of m1 missing alarms and m2 false alarms, for a set of alarms
R, the codewords that fall within this margin from the binary vector
Bin(R) are the codewords that have a ’1’ when a Bin(R) has a ’0’ in
at most m1 positions, and have a ’0’ when Bin(R) has a ’1’ in at most
m2 positions.
The error correction part of the algorithm can be computed off-line,
in the PCP module, or on-line, when the alarms are received. In the
first case, one computes for each occupied leaf (i.e., for each codeword),
the binary vectors whose number of 0’s and 1’s differ to this codeword
respectively by at most m1 and m2 positions. The corresponding fault
classes Ci are added to the list pointed by the leaf (see for example
in Figure 1.5 the new binary tree when m1 = 1 and m2 = 0 and in
Figure 1.6 the new binary tree when m1 = 0 and m2 = 1). The on-
line approach is discussed in the next section when trade-offs between
storage requirement and time requirement for the FLA are considered.
Let us illustrate the algorithm with different scenarios in the example
of Figure 1.2 when the set of received alarms is R = (a2, a3) (a2 is
issued by e2, and a3 is issued by e3). Hence, Bin(R) = (0110), which
corresponds to an empty leaf of the tree in Figure 1.4. Let us check the
following scenarios:
m1 = 1, m2 = 0: One missing alarm and no false alarm are tol-
erated. In this case (Figure 1.5), the output of the algorithm is
the leaf Bin(C2) = (0111) with one mismatch which corresponds
to the following solution:
Failure of p3 with one mismatch.
m1 = 0, m2 = 1: One false alarm and no missing alarm are tol-
erated. In this case (Figure 1.6) the output of the algorithm is
the leaf Bin(C4) = (0100) with one mismatch which corresponds
to the following solution:
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Failure of p4 with one mismatch.
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Figure 1.5. Binary tree when m1 = 1
and m2 = 0
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Figure 1.6. Binary tree when m1 = 0
and m2 = 1
In the considered example, there are only four monitoring elements,
the tolerance m1 = m2 = 1 is too loose because it amounts to accept-
ing 50% erroneous alarms. For this reason, we will not consider this
tolerance or other tolerances with higher values of m1 and m2.
5. Algorithmic complexity
In this section, we present the complexity of the FLA and show how
the algorithm can be modified to meet certain complexity requirements.
Let us denote by n the number of different components in the es-
tablished channels, by na the number of alarming elements and by
nna = n−na the passive (non-alarming) elements. na is also the depth of
the binary tree and therefore the binary vector size. Let us also denote
by t the number of single fault classes and by c the number of established
channels.
Pre-Computing Phase (PCP)
Time requirements.
1 Computation of Domains : The computational complexity for this
step is at most of O(n(n−1)c2 ) = O(n
2) because the number of
channels c is much less than the number of network components.
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2 Grouping of Domains into fault classes and production of the de-
pendency matrix: each domain is associated to one na-dimensional
binary vector. The computation time needed to group identical do-
mains, and to compute the codeword Bin(Ci) is at most O(n2na).
3 Computation of the domains of multiple failures and of the corre-
sponding codewords. If d is the total number of different classes Ci
( or equivalently of different codewords), the computational time
of this step is O(d(d−1)2 na). Since d ≤ 2t, the (very) worst case
bound is O(4tna).
4 Computation of codewords with mismatching thresholds m1 and
m2. This step can be implemented as follows. For each codeword−→x = Bin(Ci), it finds all the vectors −→y such that ∑nak=1[xik −
yk]+ ≤ m1 and
∑na
k=1[yk−xik]+ ≤ m2 where [z]+ = z if z > 0 and 0
otherwise. The worst case computation time isO(2na
∑m1+m2
k=1 C
na
k ),
where Cnak =
na!
(na−k)!k! is the combinatorial coefficient (na, k).
Storage requirements. The storage memory for a binary tree
which has 2na leaves is O(2na).
FLA Main Part
1 Compute Bin(R): This module only requires a computational
time of O(na).
2 Find P (Ci)’s of the Bin(R) leaf: This module also requires a com-
putational time of O(na).
The total computational time of the on-line part of the algorithm is
O(na). This low complexity comes at a cost of a high computation time
in the PCP which is O(4tna) and an exponential storage memory of
O(2na).
The Error Correction Problem
Let us consider a received alarm vector −→r = Bin(R), which is a
binary vector of dimension na. The problem of correcting the erroneous
alarms amounts to finding a codeword Bin(Ci), for some fault class Ci,
with the minimum Hamming distance to the received word; that is, such
that the number of 1’s by which −→r and Bin(Ci) differ is minimal for all
possible fault classes Ci.
Note at this point that the code is not linear, and that it will have
very poor performances in terms of minimal distance. Nevertheless,
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the following results are important for managing monitoring equipments
in a transparent optical network. When there is no missing alarm, i.e.,
m1 = 0, finding the nearest codeword to a received word can be achieved
in polynomial time. The polynomial time algorithm first finds all the
codewords that do not have 1s at the positions where the received word
has 0s, and then sequentially remove all the common ’1’ entries between
the received word and each of the codewords identified above. The ’1’
entries left in the received word after this operation correspond to the
false alarms. On the other hand, when there are missing alarms, i.e.
m1 > 0, finding the nearest codeword to a received word is NP-complete.
This is due to the fact that when m1 > 0 and m2 = 0, the problem of
finding the nearest codeword becomes the red-blue set cover problem as
defined in [29]. The red-blue set cover problem is an extension of the
set cover problem which is an NP-complete problem, hence it is also
NP-complete.
From the above result, we see that for the error correction problem,
it is more desirable to have false alarms than missing alarms. This has a
significant practical influence as the most common source of alarm errors
comes from setting wrong threshold values for monitoring equipments.
Our analysis above indicates that one should set the threshold values
high rather than low in order to restrict all missing alarms (with the
possibility of producing more false alarms).
Trading time for storage
In this section, we look at the problem of reducing the exponential
storage requirement for the binary tree. Since the storage memory is
proportional to the number of leaves, the way to reduce the storage
memory is to reduce the number of leaves in the tree. The leaf reduction
can be achieved in two steps.
In the first step, we remove all the leaves that correspond to erroneous
alarms (that is, those obtained for m1 > 0 and/or m2 > 0) and carry
out the error correction module of the algorithm on-line. There are two
reasons for carrying out this module in the on-line part of the algorithm
: first, it helps speeding up the PCP phase of the algorithm; second,
the overall complexity of the algorithm is lower, as the received alarm
vector −→r = Bin(R) is compared only with the codewords corresponding
to single or multiple failures in the absence of erroneous alarms (i.e., with
m1 = m2 = 0), not with all the leaves. This is particularly true in cases
where the problem of finding the nearest codeword can be solved in
polynomial time (i.e., when m1 = 0).
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After this first step, we are left with a tree whose leaves point to at
most one set P (Ci) each. Each of these sets P (Ci) is made of subsets
of network components, the union of the domains of all elements within
a subset is Ci. Recall that in the tree construction process for multiple
faults, among all the subsets of faulty elements which satisfy the con-
dition that the union of the domains of all elements within a subset is
Ci, we only keep in P (Ci) subsets with the smallest cardinality. Let
us define a failure scenario associated to a set P (Ci) as a set of fault
classes for single failure which satisfies the condition that the unions of
the fault classes in that set is Ci. In the second step of the leaf reduction
process, we further reduce the leaves in the binary tree by exploiting the
fact that the online decoding time for a leaf depends on the number of
failure scenarios associated to the corresponding set P (Ci). We proceed
as follows. Pick a number m ≥ 1. If the number of failure scenarios
associated to P (Ci) is less than m, then P (Ci) is removed from the tree.
Otherwise, it is maintained in the tree.
With such a trimmed tree, whenever the received codeword −→r corre-
sponds to a set P (Ci) that is associated to at least m failure scenarios,
it is retrieved as before, since it is pointed by the corresponding leaves.
Otherwise, if the received codeword −→r corresponds to a set P (Ci) that
is associated to less than m failure scenarios, we find these on-line, using
an exhaustive search. This exhaustive search only needs to examine at
most m different sets of single fault classes that correspond to P (Ci)
to find the optimal subsets. Let us denote by t the number of single
failure codewords. Since there is a maximum of 2t different possible
subsets of single fault classes, there are less than 2t/m codewords whose
corresponding set P (Ci) is associated to more than m different failure
scenarios. Furthermore, the computational time to identify one subset
of fault classes that corresponds to a codeword is O(nat). Hence, by
storing in the binary tree only the codewords whose corresponding set
P (Ci) that has more than m failure scenarios, one can store less than
2t/m leaves in the binary tree and still guarantee a worst case decoding
time of O(mnat). By varying m, one can actually choose different levels
of time and storage complexities for the FLA.
The on-line decoding strategy when a word −→r = Bin(R) is received
is as follows. The algorithm iteratively identifies all codewords within
a mismatching threshold m1 and m2 from −→r . This step has a time
complexity of O(
∑m1+m2
k=1 C
na
k ). For each codeword, the algorithm first
traverses the binary tree in O(na) time, to find the optimal failure sce-
nario. If the codeword is not in the binary tree, the tree search will fail,
the algorithm will then carry out an exhaustive search in time O(mnat)
to find the optimal failure scenario, where m is the number of failure
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scenarios that are associated with −→r . The worst case bound for the
on-line decoding module is O(mnat
∑m1+m2
k=1 C
na
k ).
6. Conclusion
Ideally, methods to locate faults in a WDM network should be sensi-
tive to hard and soft failures, should rely on the analog signals or cope
with lost and false alarms, should avoid the use of probabilities since
they are time-varying parameters that are difficult to estimate, should
be aware of the possible failure scenarios and how they propagated under
correlation rules [30], or an appropriate taxonomy of the network ele-
ments as developed in this chapter and [12], and should rapidly identify
an accurate set of faulty candidates. Despite the NP-hard complexity
of the multiple-failure problem, an efficient algorithm that meets these
requirements has been described in this chapter. We have also discussed
the complexity of the various modules of the algorithm, and shown how
the NP-hard part of the algorithm can be done off-line.
Without monitoring equipments along the optical physical layer, op-
tical networks provide few information about failures. These monitoring
components detect different signals and thus failures, and the Fault Lo-
cation Algorithm should be extended in order to take this into account.
Instead of deploying additional monitoring equipment, or in comple-
ment to this deployment, a second solution is to exploit the interop-
erability between the layers so that a single fault management system
using information from the different layers could become more accurate
and locate a larger number of failure scenarios.
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